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7U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and for U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia. We welcome you here this afternoon. 
Our third witness is Nick Rosenkranz, who also worked in the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, serving as an At-
torney-Advisor. Prior to joining the Department of Justice, Mr. 
Rosenkranz served as a law clerk for both Judge Frank 
Easterbrook on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
and for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. We wel-
come you here this afternoon, Mr. Rosenkranz. 
Our fourth and final witness is Sarah Cleveland, Marrs McLean 
Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law. Ms. 
Cleveland is a former Rhodes Scholar and a law clerk to U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Harry Blackmun. Her interests include inter-
national human and international labor rights, foreign affairs and 
the Constitution, and Federal civil procedure. She is the author of 
many publications, including ‘‘Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: In-
dians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of 
Plenary Power in Foreign Affairs,’’ Texas Law Review, 2002. We 
thank you very much for being here this afternoon, Ms. Cleveland. 
For those who have not testified before this Committee before, let 
me explain very briefly our lighting system. We have what is called 
the 5-minute rule. You basically have 5 minutes to testify. Every-
one, including Members up here, are limited to 5 minutes. 
We have the system there, the green light will be on for 4 min-
utes, the yellow light, we hope—it wasn’t working in the last hear-
ing we had a few hours ago, we hope it is working now. The yellow 
light is supposed come on for 1 minute. And then the red light, we 
would ask you to wrap up as close as possible when that light come 
on. We will give you a little leeway but we would ask you to keep 
as close to that as possible. 
It is the practice of this Committee to swear in all the witnesses 
appearing before it. So if you would all please rise at this time and 
raise your right hand. 
[Witnesses sworn.] 
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. All witnesses have answered 
in the affirmative. 
We will begin with you this afternoon, Professor Dinh. You have 
5 minutes. 
TESTIMONY OF VIET D. DINH, PROFESSOR,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
Mr. DINH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members 
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here again 
to talk about this important topic raised by House Resolution 97: 
When, if ever, is it appropriate for American courts to consult for-
eign courts of law in an interpretation of purely American law, par-
ticularly the United States Constitution? 
Let me start, as Mr. Feeney did, by listing the various areas in 
which, in my opinion, consideration of foreign sources of law would 
not only be appropriate but I think essential in the decisionmaking 
process of U.S. courts. 
First, obviously, where the case turns on the meaning of a for-
eign law. For example, in the case 2 years ago of J.P. Morgan v. 
Traffic Stream. Second where the case turns on the actions and 
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8wishes of foreign tribunals. For example, again, on the same term, 
the case of Hoffman-LaRoche v. Empagran. Third, where the case 
turns on the existence of meaning of the law of nations. Again, 
from the same term, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. And also when a 
court is interpreting a treaty, it is natural to look to the interpreta-
tion of that treaty by the courts of nations, who are also signatories 
to that treaty. Olympic Airways v. Husain, also in the same term, 
to which I return. 
Where foreign sources of law is not relevant and appropriate, 
however, is in the interpretation of the United States Constitution. 
There are several reasons for this. The Chairman and Mr. Feeney 
have gone through them in length. I just want to summarize here 
my testimony. 
First is the obvious fact that foreign courts are not interpreting 
the United States Constitution. How foreign courts interpret, for 
example, the European Convention on Human Rights tell us very 
little what a different document, that is our U.S. Constitution, 
means. It may well be, as many Justices have observed, that for-
eign judges often look to the United States Supreme Court prece-
dent in interpreting constitutions and treaties, modeled after the 
United States Constitution. This is perfectly legitimate and normal; 
just as U.S. judges do and should look to the foreign antecedents 
to the U.S. Constitution to discern its meaning. But there is very 
little reason why the meaning of the U.S. Constitution should be 
informed by the views, the post-constitutional views, of contem-
porary foreign judges interpreting their own laws and constitution. 
Second is democratic legitimacy. It is okay to consider foreign in-
terpretations of a common treaty, say the Warsaw Convention, not 
only because the courts are interpreting the same document. Rath-
er, it is also okay because the democratic process has said that it 
is, implicitly or explicitly. Congress, in ratifying a treaty, has the 
opportunity to decide whether or not to involve the Federal judici-
ary at all by making a treaty self-executing or not. Even where 
Congress has given a role to judges in interpreting and enforcing 
a treaty by making it self-executing, Congress can specify the 
terms of such judicial involvement through reservation and other 
statutory language. In fact, the preamble to some treaties, again 
such as the Warsaw Convention, expressly recognize that intent 
and purpose to provide uniform legal principles or a uniform man-
ner of interpretation. 
By contrast, in cases of purely American law, there are no cor-
responding democratic authorization of nor legislative checks on 
the reliance on foreign judgments. There is simply no way that I 
or any other citizen, or you as elected representatives of us, can af-
fect how a foreign court would view a U.S. Constitutional issue. 
Thirdly and finally, there is simply a matter of consistent meth-
odology. The reason why I bring up the Warsaw Convention and 
the case of Olympic Airways v. Husain so often in this brief state-
ment is the fact that nobody doubts that consideration of foreign 
judgments in that context is legitimate. Yet a majority of the Su-
preme Court in deciding the matter neglected to even cite the fact 
that two other signatory nations have interpreted the exact same 
convention, deciding the exact same issue in a diametrically op-
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9posed way from which the Supreme Court had come to its conclu-
sion. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia threw up his hands and said, here I 
have been saying for the last 3 or 4 years we shouldn’t consider for-
eign laws in illegitimate instances. In the one instance where it is 
legitimate, you can probably ignore the relevant judgment of for-
eign courts. 
The reason for this, I think one of the explanations for this, is 
that we as American lawyers, and especially as American judges, 
are just not very good at doing foreign laws. We are not steeped 
in their tradition, we do not know the interpretation. We do not 
know the entire body of law of a particular nation or of a particular 
organization or of a particular convention. So what is left is that 
we would cherry-pick those sources of law which would tend to sup-
port our point of view, whether it be in a brief or in a particular 
opinion. 
In the short run, that may ostensibly add to some ethereal legit-
imacy to or persuasiveness to that particular opinion or brief, but 
I would contend that in the long run and not very long either, but 
just a little bit of reflection would indicate the underlying illegit-
imacy and lack of reliability of such reliance. 
I will close there and take any further questions. Thank you very 
much. 
Mr. CHABOT. We appreciate it, Professor. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dinh follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 
Thank you very much for this opportunity to comment on House Resolution 97 
and the very important constitutional issues raised by the consideration and appli-
cation of foreign judgments to the interpretation of United States law, and particu-
larly upon interpretation of the United States Constitution. 
The issue raised by today’s hearing is indeed an important one: when, if ever, U.S. 
courts should consider or rely upon the decisions of foreign courts in the interpreta-
tion of American law. The issue is particularly important at this time, as in recent 
years it appears our courts are more often referring to foreign laws and foreign 
court decisions to justify the conclusion reached in a particular case. American 
courts often refer to foreign law even in cases involving interpretation of a purely 
domestic law. Thus, unfortunately, it appears our courts, most noticeably the Su-
preme Court, are looking to foreign decisions and legal principles in the wrong in-
stances. 
The consideration of foreign court decisions is not always improper or inappro-
priate. Where the law to be construed is a treaty, the interpretations given that 
treaty by other nations that are parties to the agreement are certainly relevant; our 
courts should consider these precedents in formulating their own interpretations of 
the same legal provision. Where, however, the law being interpreted is solely domes-
tic, American law, and particularly where the interpretation is of a constitutional 
provision, decisions by foreign tribunals on a seemingly similar issue have no rel-
evance. The foreign forum was not tasked with interpreting and applying U.S. law, 
but rather has the responsibility for applying its own laws. 
Despite what I conclude is a clear and necessary distinction between when the 
consideration of foreign judgments is appropriate, many Justices of the Supreme 
Court have made it clear that the trend of considering foreign judgments is not com-
ing to an end, but rather is expanding. It is for that reason that I believe this is 
such an important topic. 
When the court is called upon to interpret a treaty or agreement among nations, 
the court must ‘‘accord the judgments of our sister signatories ‘considerable 
weight.’ ’’ Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)). For example, in ap-
plying provisions of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court has, in many in-
stances, carefully considered the case law of parties to that treaty. See, e.g., El Al 
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Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1999); Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 550–51 (1991); Air France, 470 U.S. 392. But see 
Olympic Airways, 540 U.S. 644. 
Unfortunately, in this area, where consideration of the judgments of foreign courts 
has significance, our courts have not consistently looked to such judgments. In at 
least one instance, foreign decisions were not considered at all by the majority. See 
Olympic Airways, 540 U.S. 644. This failure to consider the decisions of the courts 
of other countries who are parties to the relevant agreement represents a failure 
to follow a well-established legal principle—to ensure, to the extent possible, the 
consistent interpretation and application of a single law. 
Where two nations have jointly adopted a single law, it is consistent with accepted 
legal principles that an attempt should be made to provide for consistent interpreta-
tions of that law. ‘‘Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared under-
standing of the contracting parties. Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to the par-
ties an intent that their respective courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently.’’ 
Id., at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The legitimacy of considering foreign interpretations of a common treaty derives 
not simply from the technicality that the courts are interpreting the same docu-
ment. Rather, it stems also from the interaction with the democratic process. First, 
Congress in exercising its constitutional authority to ratify a treaty has the oppor-
tunity to decide whether or not to involve the judiciary at all by making the treaty 
self-executing. Even where Congress has afforded judges a role in enforcing and in-
terpreting a treaty, it can specify the terms of such judicial involvement through 
reservations and other statutory tools. In fact, the preamble to some treaties, such 
as the Warsaw Convention, expressly recognize that intent and purpose—to provide 
uniform legal principles or a uniform manner of regulation. Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air preamble, 
Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40105). 
By contrast, in cases of purely American law, there are no corresponding demo-
cratic authorization of nor legislative checks on the reliance on foreign judgments. 
There is simply no way that I or any other citizen can affect how a foreign court 
would view a particular issue. 
It is our own courts and not foreign courts that are tasked with interpreting our 
laws. The American judiciary is not independent of the Constitution and the laws 
of this country. Indeed, it is from the Constitution itself that any authority to inter-
pret our laws vests in the judiciary. The Constitution does not separate and isolate 
us from other countries. It contains the treaty power, recognizing the need to co-
operate and build relationships with other countries. It also does not limit or pre-
vent our own lawmakers from looking to foreign laws and foreign court judgments 
in drafting, debating and developing our own laws. 
Though most recent consideration of foreign legal trends has occurred in connec-
tion with social issues, courts could conceivably extend this practice to use foreign 
authorities when adjudicating other fundamental issues, including our approach to 
our own national defense. For example, we cannot tolerate a court’s invalidating ini-
tiatives in the War on Terror on the grounds that some other nations view those 
actions as incorrect or unwise. To give weight to foreign decisions on matters of 
American concern opens the door for consideration of foreign decisions on all mat-
ters, even those that should ultimately be matters for us alone. 
Constitutional rights exist because of the Constitution itself. They do not derive 
from any source external to that document. It is through this contract between our 
government and our citizens that the government has the authority to enact laws 
and the courts have the authority to interpret them. The Constitution tasks our 
country’s courts with the interpretation of the document. It is not within the pur-
view of any foreign tribunal to interpret the meaning of any provision of our Con-
stitution. Foreign views of how our Constitution should be interpreted should pro-
vide no instruction to our own courts; nor should our courts eschew their own re-
sponsibility of interpretation by relying instead on the views of foreign jurists. In 
the same way that the parties to a treaty should respect each other’s interpretations 
of those mutually binding agreements, so too should American courts look to the un-
derstanding (as set forth in its text) the document was given by the actual parties 
to it—i.e., the American people at the time of its drafting and ratification. 
The recent reliance on international sources raises issues of sovereignty and sepa-
ration of powers, and ultimately the dilution of the power of the people in this coun-
try. As Justice Scalia explains,
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America 
that we are expounding. The practices of other nations, particularly other de-
mocracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among 
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our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text 
permitting, in our Constitution as well. But where there is not first a settled 
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlight-
ened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon 
Americans through the Constitution.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
This conclusion holds across the spectrum of interpretive theories. Indeed, it is 
perhaps most necessary for expansive methodologies, such as ones depending on 
‘‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’’ 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958). Because such expansive strategies are 
less anchored in the Constitution’s text, structure or history, a jurisprudential limi-
tation on the geographic or jurisdiction sources of law is necessary to ensure that 
constitutional law remains predicated on neutral principles and not on the whims 
of individual judges or court compositions. 
To be sure, legislative direction to the courts on how to interpret the Constitution 
may raise significant separation of powers concerns. This Resolution, however, does 
not provide such direction, or otherwise require the courts to adhere to any of its 
statements. Rather, the Resolution merely provides the sense of this body that inter-
pretations of our Constitution should not be governed by foreign judgments or views. 
It is wholly appropriate for the House of Representatives to provide its opinions 
on the interpretation of the Constitution, a document that its members, just as the 
members of the judiciary, have sworn to uphold and defend. It is certainly no more 
inappropriate than the all-too-often practice of federal judges, at all levels, to sug-
gest legislative changes to Congress or even to make policy pronouncements on 
pending legislative matters. 
In the final analysis, I conclude that there is a place for the consideration of for-
eign judgments, and that place is in the interpretation of treaties with those foreign 
nations. Where consideration of foreign judgments is inappropriate is in the arena 
of purely domestic laws, for only when a formal agreement has been reached via 
a ratified treaty to conduct ourselves as they do in other countries is such consider-
ation appropriate in our democratic system. Thus, I support the declaration set forth 
in House Resolution 97 that ‘‘judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the 
Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judg-
ments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judg-
ments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning 
of the Constitution of the United States.’’
Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Whelan, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
TESTIMONY OF M. EDWARD WHELAN, III, PRESIDENT,
ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER 
Mr. WHELAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Chabot and other Mem-
bers of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
here today. 
Mr. CHABOT. I am not sure the mike is on. If it is, you need to 
pull it a little closer. 
Mr. WHELAN. Should be on now. 
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 
Mr. WHELAN. Good afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to tes-
tify here today. 
Two recent developments confirm that the threat posed by the 
Court’s misuse of foreign law is real and growing. 
First is the Supreme Court’s ruling in March in Roper v. Sim-
mons. There, a five-Justice majority relied on international opinion 
as it held the execution of offenders who were 17 at the time of 
their offense violates the eighth amendment. And the sixth Justice, 
although in dissent, approved of the majority’s resort to foreign 
law. The facts of Roper warrant special attention as they starkly 
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